Russian-Georgian Conflict via Realpolitik
The recent conflict in Georgia over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has certainly got the classical realists shifting about their chairs (as if they weren’t shifting before). If there were delusions before about the possibility of a pro-Western, cooperative Russia, the showdown in Georgia ought to clear up any misconceptions. Because, in reality, Russia isn’t, nor has it ever been, a pro-Western country. Russia is beginning, once again, to exert her influence in her respective sphere of influence. The world is witnessing a Russia pushing the pushing the scales of the balance of power, intentionally setting the balance more towards it side. Set aside the petty media politicking (especially Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s plead for Western help) and cries for “humanitarian intervention,” because this conflict, simply put, is a game of power politics. Russia’s push into Georgia confirms Russia’s intent on being a major player in the international arena, and the major power in its respective region. The fact that Georgia was backed by the West (particularly the U.S., the U.K., and Israel) makes this into more than a petty border conflict between a major and minor state; the conflict in Georgia is a proxy war between Russia and the West.
Russia is attempting to regain international prestige and recognition by invading a country that is strongly supported by the West. Regardless of the casus belli (which is indeed dubious), the fact of the matter is that Russia is making up for ground lost during the 1990s. After suffer crippling economic malaise, border and domestic strife (viz. Ukraine and Chechnya, respectively), and international humiliation in the Balkans, Russia is back on its feet thanks to an energy market boom and a relative decline in power and influence of the West. Thanks to America’s commitments in the Middle East and Europe’s ineffectiveness to exert real leverage, Russia is back on the stage again, playing another major role — this time as Mr Authoritarian, not Mr Marx.
In a recent article made book, international theorist Robert Kagan asserts that international politics is returning to a 19th Century balance of power structure. Except this time it isn’t limited just to Europe; it’s global. The West (lead by the U.S.) will vie for power and position with the emergence of two authoritarian (but individual) powers: Russia and China. The delusion given by the 1990s that somehow the world was moving toward interdependence guided by international institutions and worldwide norms will be fully exposed by the exertion of power by Russia and China. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese view power as passé, and both will seek to counterbalance the Western powers (lead by the U.S.). Both authoritarian nations believe that autocracy is better than democracy and will seek to expand their power positions at the expense of the West. The conflict in Georgia indicates Russia’s ability and willingness to exert its power and influence against a Western-backed democracy.
Francis Fukuyama at the end of the Cold War declared the “End of History.” That is, the end of states’ struggle for the right form of governance. The triumph of liberal democracy, to use Hegelian language, indicated the universal and homogeneous state (the perfect and ideal state). Fukuyama’s declaration may have been a bit premature, for the challenge posed to the West (liberal democracy) by Russia and China (authoritarianism) is, according to Kagan, the “Return of History” and a return to 19th Century-style balance of power structure.
So, sorry to all of you idealists out there who envisioned a world run by benevolent, democratic leaders who adhered to international norms established by a world-connected. The truth of the matter is that we still live in an anarchical international arena where states are individual, sovereign actors that compete with each other to maximize their power position. Time to read up on your Morgenthau, Keohan, and Mearsheimer. Georgia is just the beginning.
Good post. Do you think Russia has intentions to gain control the Caspian pipeline? Will threatening to kick them out of the G8 keep them “in their place”? Will bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO bring stability or will it antagonize Russia? Do you think that Russia desires to reunify the former Soviet Empire or just flex its muscles among the bordering countries? Given your post, which of the US Presidential candidates foreign policy strategies best deals with this “Return of History”? Am I asking a lot of questions?
Karen L
18 Aug 08 at 11:57 am
“Will threatening to kick them out of the G8 keep them “in their place”?
Empty and unrealistic threats rarely put nations “in their place”.
ginoj
18 Aug 08 at 4:59 pm
I find it interesting that both of the solutions for containing Russia come solidly out of the balance of powers (early 20th century) mindset rather than from a mindset influenced by collective security or international cooperation.
Removing Russia from the G8 or other Western international institutional regimes immediately sets it up in strategic opposition rather than extending diplomatic or internationally cooperative approaches. And expanding the Western alliance structures deep into the political/ethnic/national hotbeds of Eastern Europe and Southwest Asia is definitely reminiscent of the pre-WWI structure.
I’m not sure what that means except that it appears that some of the ideas that are gaining quick traction with Americans today are pretty old-school.
David M. Manes
18 Aug 08 at 7:59 pm
The Russians are already the largest shareholders of the Caspian Pipeline (Transneft, a Russian state-owned oil company holds app. 25% share).
Kicking Russia out of the G8 would be a bad economic move.
The NATO question is something to consider. If by some bizarro, lunatic move, Georgia, the Ukraine, or both were inducted into NATO, the geopolitical consequences would be enormous, amounting to extreme tension (and probably conflict) between Russia and the West.
I doubt Russia is seeking to unify the former Soviet Union. They are merely flexing their geopolitical muscle in their sphere of influence against a recalcitrant and openly defiant Georgia.
As for which candidate will best deal with the “Return of History,” I don’t know. Quite frankly, no one really does, because no focus has really been put on old-school power politics. I’m inclined to shy away from the Republican base, due to their ineffective diplomatic protocol and blatant unilateralism. However, I also shy away from idealistic doves who are more likely to be found in the camp to the left.
S.C. Denney
18 Aug 08 at 8:37 pm
Did you see Fukuyama’s op-ed in the Sunday Wash Post? http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/22/AR2008082202395.html
Karen L
25 Aug 08 at 12:23 pm
Fukuyama’s analysis that Russia and China (and the smaller global autocracies) are much different than Nazi Germany or the old Soviet Union, because they have accepted many “Western” constructs — such as the global, neoclassical markets — is certainly correct. However, as Fukuyama states, he doesn’t think the international order is returning to a 19th century power structure, but at the same time he says that Putin’s Russia (we all know it isn’t Medvedev’s) is similar to Alexander’s (the 19th Century Czar). Those views seem a bit incompatible, in my opinion.
Fukuyama also argues that Western ideas are reign supreme (since they “ended” history towards the end of the 20th century). He states that the modern autocracies don’t pose a legitimate challenge to the liberal democratic order. Fukuyama reasserts that liberal democracy is the preferable choice of nation-states. He even says that fundamental/radical Islamism are more of a genuine challenge — one of the statements are completely disagree with; Fukuyama is debunks his own argument by stating that radical Islamism is entirely ineffective when it comes to the ruling idea of a nation-state. However, as is well documented, “democracy” is suffering from a recession (see Larry Diamond’s FA article “The Democratic Rollback). Furthermore, much of the world, especially Latin America and Africa, are saying “no” to the Washington Consensus. Instead, politico-economic paradigms, like the “Beijing Consensus,” are becoming more popular (free-markets and limited political rights).
Overall, Fukuyama’s article is right in saying that we are certainly not returning to a cold war power structure. The autocratic powers today don’t have the truly universal appeal that National Socialism or Communism had, but they do pose a real challenge to the liberal international order, even while working from within its confines (viz. neoclassical market structure). However, I think he’s wrong in saying that we aren’t returning to something similar to the 19th Century Concert of Europe, on a global playing field.
S.C. Denney
25 Aug 08 at 1:23 pm