US Involvement in Afghanistan
I recently had the privilege to hear Mark Schneider, former Peace Corps director and Senior Vice President of the International Crisis Group, speak about human rights and US involvement in Afghanistan. He came to FSU’s Center for Human Rights as a part of their summer lecture series, so of course I jumped at the chance to hear him. (Don’t you just love college towns?) I thought that his take on our current situation overseas would be very interesting for all of you, as well.
In a nutshell, the news from Afghanistan is rotten. Mr. Schneider said that the insurgents are more powerful now than they were two years ago, and since 2005, there has been a 600% increase in suicide bombings. The opium industry is the only one that thrives, and the judicial system is completely corrupted by drug trafficking. Apparently, the drug lords tell poor Afghan farmers that they’ll buy their crops come harvest time if the farmers allow them to cross their fields without turning them in. So the poor people are trapped in a vicious cycle: often, they’ll get a better deal on their crops from the opium dealers than from any sort of aid coming from the international community, so of course they’ll choose the option that gives them the most income. This is in spite of the fact that everyone would be much better off if drug trafficking did not exist.
Mark Schneider calls this a problem with “Rule of Law.” In order to provide real justice to the people of Afghanistan, the international community must scratch the current police force and court system and begin rebuilding from the bottom up. The current force consists of highly underpaid, under-trained young men who used to be drug traffickers themselves. So he wants to take everyone out of the field, put UN troops in their posts as they are trained for eight weeks, and then put them back into place with several “police mentors” who could oversee operations for a few years. Schneider acknowledges that this would be a huge operation, in scope and expense. But the best long-term solution is never easy in the short-term. The international community has a responsibility to protect the poor people of Afghanistan, who are among the poorest in the world.
Schneider also mentioned that Afghanistan has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves. He considers Afghanistan and Pakistan, as harborers of the Taliban, to be the most dangerous places in the world to the US. In what might have been the biggest understatement of the year, he said that he deeply regrets that they have “failed to receive proper resources” because of US involvement in other areas, such as Iraq.
Just for some background: The International Crisis Group is an NGO that was founded in 1995 after the Bosnia crisis. They have workers in the field conducting interviews and doing research, and this data is eventually translated into briefs which even the UN security council reads. Schneider said that they offer strategic thinking where diplomacy isn’t working, and they always support rule-based, not force-based, international order.
What is the solution? I am sympathetic to all of the things that Schneider (via Karie) point out, but what do we do about it?
Perhaps the most difficult thing to overcome is the insidious economic incentive for farmers all across that country to cooperate with drug lords. How can we address that without just writing huge subsidy checks?
David M. Manes
28 Jun 08 at 1:21 pm
The answer is that we write huge subsidy checks. Or just buy their poppy harvests. With all the money we waste on pointless aspects of the drug war, it would turn out to be a bargain.
jkkuwitzky
28 Jun 08 at 1:40 pm
That would be a fine answer if there were no such thing as politics. Or if you could keep the entire operation a complete secret.
David M. Manes
28 Jun 08 at 1:46 pm
This is why we need a king.
jkkuwitzky
28 Jun 08 at 1:59 pm
A philosopher-king at that.
S.C. Denney
29 Jun 08 at 2:20 am
More seriously, I don’t think I agree with the bottom-up approach. I don’t really see how it is possible to do grassroots-style reformation in Afghanistan. On the contrary, a top-down approach seems more practical and realistic. The institutions and structures need to be implemented with massive oversight from foreign cooperatives. Without proper institutions, horizontal accountability, and the enforcement of the rule of law (as is emphasized by Karie), there won’t be a viable state. Once institutions are established, things can naturally trickle down.*
Of course this is all pending the ability to establish a central government in Kabul, an unlikely phenomenon to occur anytime soon (from sources I’ve read). In order for Afghanistan to be reconstructed and reconstituted as a legitimate state will take years of occupation and billions (if not trillions) of dollars in loans, grants, and foreign direct investment — not something that is politically palatable, therefore not likely to occur.
I’m thinking failed if not a collapsed state by 2015. Any takers?
*Note: Don’t confuse this with trickle-down (Reagan) economic theory.
S.C. Denney
29 Jun 08 at 11:19 pm
I think that a bottom-up approach is almost necessary for a program like this to have any sort of longevity. What’s the point in helping people who aren’t willing to help themselves at all? If the Afghan people aren’t ready to upend their lives a little bit and take a stand against the drug lords, etc., then I don’t know that foreign intervention will help. This sort of thing has come up again and again in my 461, humanitarian aid reading: if the developing nation doesn’t have a significant amount of participation in its aid programs, the aid rarely works. It has to start at the grass roots level.
On the other hand, if we don’t intervene, how much worse could it get? Something obviously needs to happen. I’m a fan of the “buy the poppy harvests” idea.
I can easily see your collapsed state by 2015.
karie
2 Jul 08 at 1:25 pm
If it is a true failed state by that time (or any time), it will be a gruesome strategic and moral blunder on the part of the civilized world. I don’t think any American government can allow that to happen.
jkkuwitzky
2 Jul 08 at 9:11 pm
A good example of grassroots-level aid (though not in an international context) is Franklin D. Roosevelt’s alphabet soup of the 1930s. Programs like the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps put money in people’s pockets, but it also allowed individuals to feel (and be) productive and invested in their country. And, we’re still reaping the benefits of their labor (in my household, we especially enjoy the folklore research and hiking trails provided by these groups).
The problem then becomes how to channel money into Afghanistan while ensuring that it will be used productively, and deciding who gets to define what that means.
Kelly
3 Jul 08 at 1:10 pm
Institutions will dictate the behavior of the individuals. Furthermore, institutions will provide the bedrock for establishing state foundations and will provide oversight to aid.
There are reasons why Haiti is still plagued by destitute and why many of the south eastern Asian countries (especially Japan) are stable (often flourishing) nations.
There is currently a bottom-up campaign going on in western Iraq (see the Sons of Iraq). This was done before during the British fight against the Ottomans. It didn’t work so well then, I doubt it will work much better now.
S.C. Denney
3 Jul 08 at 7:38 pm
Do institutions dictate the behavior of the individuals who run this blog? I believe all of you go to Harding and are (all least somewhat) liberals.
Should we assume that institutions dictate the behavior of individuals or allow trust citizens with some agency in the making of their own futures?
Kelly
5 Jul 08 at 3:21 pm
“Do institutions dictate the behavior of the individuals who run this blog? I believe all of you go to Harding and are (all least somewhat) liberals.”
Great example. Prior to coming to Harding I considered myself “relatively” religious. After going to Harding for 3 years, I’ve found myself “relatively” agnostic and particularly skeptic of organized religion and “orthodoxy.”
Moreover, prior to coming to Harding I was somewhat of a social conservative. Now, I am, from most perspectives, a social liberal. Harding has had a great impact on my life and has helped me to see many good and many absurd points of life. But let’s not analyze this too much.
You latter comment sounds as if I have been advocating for totalitarianism. I’m not quite sure that your understanding of structural institutionalism is the same as mine. To support institutionalism from a liberal democracy perspective is to support civil liberties and civil rights — sort of the apex of “trusting citizens with some agency in the making of their own futures” — no?
S.C. Denney
5 Jul 08 at 4:03 pm
I do not think you are a fascist.
But your position is still unclear to me. As I understand your previous comments, the effects that Harding has had upon you are antithetical to the mission of that university. If that institution has dictated your behavior, it seems to have done so in a manner opposite to what is generally intended. (Please do not view this as a critique of your personal convictions, but as my attempt to understand you.) My point by bringing up the paradox of this blog and your (plural) university affiliations is to demonstrate that, at least in this case, the individuals seem to be bucking the institution.
But perhaps this is irrelevant to your approach to the disbursement of foreign aid.
Kelly
7 Jul 08 at 2:35 pm
It is a bit tangential.
The bottom line to my position is that without appropriate institutions in place, a properly functioning government in this context, the prospects for success are slim. Without a stable Kabul, you cannot have a peaceful and prosperous people. This is the case because institutions in government generally control the quality and therefore the behavior of individuals. A grassroots campaign in Afghanistan without a stable and legitimate government is treating a symptom and not the disease.
S.C. Denney
7 Jul 08 at 4:42 pm